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Communication Management and Trust: Their Role in Building
Resilience to “Surprises” Such As Natural Disasters, Pandemic Flu, and
Terrorism
P. H. Longstaff 1 and Sung-Un Yang 1

ABSTRACT. In times of public danger such as natural disasters and health emergencies, a country’s
communication systems will be some of its most important assets because access to information will make
individuals and groups more resilient. Communication by those charged with dealing with the situation is
often critical. We analyzed reports from a wide variety of crisis incidents and found a direct correlation
between trust and an organization’s preparedness and internal coordination of crisis communication and
the effectiveness of its leadership. Thus, trust is one of the most important variables in effective
communication management in times of “surprise.”
Key Words: communication; disasters; resilience; trust

INTRODUCTION
Resilience is a new concept for many managers and
policy makers. It requires a change in thinking about
the goals of preparing for some kinds of risk that
might overwhelm all efforts to resist them such as
powerful hurricanes, pandemics, or terrorist attacks.
The Resilience Alliance has defined resilience as
the “capacity of a system to absorb disturbance,
undergo change, and still retain essentially the same
function, structure, identity, and feedbacks” (http://
www.resalliance.org/; see also Gunderson 2000). In
other words, the system has the ability to bounce
back after a “surprise.” Although a system with
resilience capacity is likely to be sustainable over a
long period of time, resilience does not necessarily
mean that the system will look just like it did before
a surprise. Often the system will have to change as
it adapts to new situations, but it will survive. Thus,
a resilience strategy does not guarantee short-term
stability, but if a system exhibits resilience, it is
likely to be stable in the long term (Hanson and
Roberts 2005).
How would one design or redesign a
communication system if one wanted to build
resilience for individuals or groups? That is, if one
wanted to increase the chances that individuals and
1
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groups would bounce back fairly quickly from
surprises like a tsunami or pandemic flu. The first
thing one would do is try to understand what makes
people and institutions resilient (Masten 2001,
Allenby and Fink 2005, Longstaff 2005). One
would find that communication is an absolutely
essential element of resilience in many systems.
However, policy discussions of the role of
communication in times of surprise have tended to
take a focus that is limited to the technical reliability
of communication systems, and often, the messages
sent by these systems are just assumed to be
effective. When the content is dealt with at all,
planners often assume that handing out brochures
or broadcasting government-approved updates on
the situation will allow people to put their lives back
together as quickly as possible. However, all
attempts to distribute information will be in vain if
the people receiving it do not trust the message or
the sender of the message (Griffin et al. 2004).
In many animal species, and even in some plants,
information about opportunities and dangers in the
environment is used by all individuals. This
information can be obtained by observing what
works and does not work for others. If everyone uses
trial-and-error tactics, this information reduces the
number of errors and increases the number of
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successes for the individuals in the group. Some
species that live together use deliberate signals
about where to find food, e.g., the famous bee dance,
or the presence of predators, e.g., specific noises
made by many species to signal danger (Danchin et
al. 2004). However, information exchange only
increases the chance of survival for individuals if
the information is correct and transmitted
accurately. In systems in which individuals cannot
double-check the information before acting on it,
this requires that the sender of the information be
trusted.
The necessity of a trusted source for individual and
group risk assessment has been well established
(Slovic 2000). Functions for which information
must be trustworthy include scanning for changes
in resources and trustworthy individuals and
detecting damage, intruders, and dangerous trends.
Individuals or organizations use this type of trusted
information to make critical decisions about their
safety (Blanchard-Boehm 1998, Atwood and Major
2000, Comfort et al. 2003); the fact that they trust
the information does not mean that it is accurate.
Someone might trust information that turns out to
be false. However, generally, people trust
information that comes from a trusted source and/
or is consistent with the facts as known. A trusted
source is someone who people do not perceive to
have a reason to lie to them and who they believe
has access to accurate information. If the trusted
source provides information that is inconsistent with
the facts as known, e.g., the situation is not under
control although it was stated to be, people must
either change their trust of the source or their trust
in their own observations.
For individuals and organizations, trust often
requires a “deep and constant engagement” (K. Chin
unpublished manuscript), a give and take that builds
faith in the other(s) over time. It cannot be
established on the first day of a disaster. This leads
to the conclusion that trusted communication must
be planned. Trusted communications not only allow
emergency responder organizations to help people
build their own resilience, but to help them build
their own internal resilience. Trusted communication
will allow the organization and individuals within
it to adapt more quickly by increasing the potential
for change (Berkes and Folke 2002) and enhancing
the adaptive cycle of the organization (Holling and
Gunderson 2002).

Resilience in a situation like a hurricane or
pandemic requires that individuals and organizations
have the ability both to receive trusted information
from a central source that can see the whole picture
(i.e., a point-to-multipoint system, e.g., government
and news organizations; Quarantelli 2002) and to
contact individuals to ascertain damage to specific
people and assets (i.e., a point-to-point system, e.g.,
telephony and email; Samarajiva 2005). If
individuals and groups do not have access to both
of these systems, there is a much greater likelihood
of panic (Glass and Schoch-Spana 2002,
Surowiecki 2004).
Advance planning for communication that will
enable resilience is, in most cases, a function of
government. In most countries, only governments
can look at their entire communications sector of
both point-to-point and point-to-multipoint firms,
so they are uniquely situated to see how each agency
and industry can play a roll in resilience
communication. For example, appropriate communication
policies can deal with any market failures, including
those of firms, that do not deliver the services
needed for the resilience of individuals and groups.
The right mix of these communication assets may
be different for each country and will often be
different in various parts of countries. The
difference will be particularly acute between urban
and rural areas. There is an important role for
government in maintaining the communication
functions for this classic public good, but not
necessarily the current technology for the
dissemination of information. For example, in some
communities, telephone services such as “reverse
911” may be the best way to broadcast important
information.
Perhaps the most important and least understood
role for policy makers is insuring that emergency
communications can be trusted by other emergency
responders and by the public. This seems to mean
that at a minimum, they provide for ongoing
communication that helps to build trust and that they
mandate plans for communications in times of
surprise.
Trust within the organizations that must respond to
a surprise, e.g., governments, nongovernmental
organizations, media, telecommunications, and
electric utilities, also has an effect on their ability
to produce trusted communications for others. This
aspect of communication management in times of
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crisis has not been well studied. How does trust
affect the management of crisis communication and
the plans for communication in such times? We next
describe research that was undertaken to test the role
of trust in the planning and management of
communication in crisis situations.
METHODS
To test these ideas about the role of trust in
emergency or crisis situations, we gained access to
an extensive collection of reports about situations
defined as involving a crisis. The Transboundary
Crisis Management Data Bank is maintained by the
Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, Maxwell
School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse
University, Syracuse, New York, USA. These
reports include a wide variety of situations that
became crises, along with information about how
they were handled. Each report is coded for a wide
variety of factors. Our analysis was limited by this
preexisting coding, but we were able to find strong
correlations in the data to support several
hypotheses and to develop a model that illustrates
our findings. Because effective leadership was
coded in the data, we included it as a possible
significant variable, but acknowledge that this is a
much-debated concept.
Hypotheses and research questions
We proposed two hypotheses and two research
questions regarding the relations among crisis
management variables. More specifically, we
examined how crisis management antecedents such
as trust and crisis-handling leadership affect crisis
management outcomes such as internal coordination
of crisis communications among crisis managers
and attribution of crisis fault to external parties,
mediated by the degree of crisis preparedness (Fig.
1). We also explored how the relations imposed
differed when we controlled for the degree of crisis
surprise to crisis managers in the proposed model
(Fig. 2).
First, we proposed a positive effect of leadership on
crisis preparedness and the coordination of crisis
communications as follows. In hypothesis 1a, the
effectiveness of the leadership in dealing with a
crisis is positively associated with the preparedness
for a crisis. In hypothesis 1b, the effectiveness of
the leadership in dealing with a crisis is positively

associated with the internal coordination of crisis
communications.
Second, we proposed that more crisis preparedness
will lead to more internal coordination of crisis
communications and less attribution of crisis fault
to external parties as follows. In hypothesis 2a, the
preparedness for a crisis is positively associated
with the internal coordination of crisis
communications. In hypothesis 2b, the preparedness
for a crisis is negatively associated with the
attribution of crisis fault to parties other than their
own actors.
Third, for the effects of trust on crisis management
outcomes, we explored how internal and external
trust (i.e., the level of trust that the crisis
management actors display toward their own group
or parties other than their own, respectively) affects
crisis management variables. We proposed that
solid internal trust leads to better internal
coordination of crisis communications, whereas a
lack of external trust leads to more preparedness for
a potential crisis. Hence, we examined the following
research questions. Research question 1a: To what
extent is there a relationship between the level of
trust that the crisis management actors display
toward their own groups or other parties and the
preparedness for a crisis? Research question 1b: To
what extent is there a relationship between the level
of trust that the crisis management actors display
toward their own groups or other parties and the
internal coordination of crisis communications?
Finally, controlling for the effects of crisis surprise
(i.e., how unexpected the crisis was for the crisis
managers), we also explored how the relationships
suggested above might be different. Thus, research
question 2 was: Controlling for the effect of the
degree of unexpected crisis occurrence to the crisis
managers, how different are the effects of
leadership, crisis preparedness, and trust on crisis
management?
Proposed models
Two path models were proposed on the basis of the
suggested hypotheses and research questions. In
model A (Fig. 1), trust displayed toward both the
crisis management actors and other parties leads to
better preparedness for a crisis and better internal
coordination of crisis communications. Leadership
in dealing with a crisis predicts the preparedness for
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Fig. 1. Model A: Proposed baseline model of crisis communication management, with hypothesis
notation.

the crisis and the internal coordination of crisis
communications. Finally, the degree of preparedness
for a crisis positively influences the internal
coordination of crisis communication and lessens
the degree of the attribution of crisis fault to parties
other than the crisis management actors. Thus,
model A was the baseline model, in which:
Crisis preparedness = a0 + b1(internal trust) + b2
(external trust) + b3(leadership) + e (1) Crisis
communications = a0 + b1(internal trust) + b2
(external trust) + b3(leadership) + b4(crisis
preparedness) + e (2) Attribution of crisis fault =
a0 + b1(crisis preparedness) + e (3)
In addition to the relations imposed in model A, the
degree of crisis surprise was controlled in model B
by additional structural paths from crisis surprise to
the internal coordination of crisis communication

and the degree of the attribution of crisis fault (Fig.
2). Thus, model B comprised:
Crisis preparedness = a0 + b1(internal trust) + b2
(external trust) + b3(leadership) + b4(crisis
surprise) + e (4) Crisis communications = a0 + b1
(internal trust) + b2(external trust) + b3(leadership)
+ b4(crisis preparedness) + b5(crisis surprise) + e
(5) Attribution of crisis fault = a0 + b1(crisis
preparedness) + b2(crisis surprise) + e (6)
Description of data
The data consisted of 82 crisis cases collected from
different regions of the world for seven crisis types:
environmental, fiscal, natural disaster, legal,
military, political, and technological. There were
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Fig. 2. Model B: Proposed model of crisis communication management controlling for crisis surprise,
with hypothesis notation.

nine environmental crisis cases, 13 fiscal crisis
cases, seven natural disaster crisis cases, five legal
crisis cases, 10 military crisis cases, 33 political
crisis cases, and five technological crisis cases
(Table 1). The unit of analysis was the crisis case
(N = 82).

and external trust were 0.71 and 0.89, respectively
(Table 2).
To measure leadership in dealing with a crisis, we
used two measurement items: the nature of the effect
of leadership on the crisis and the degree of
experience with similar crises possessed by the
person or group providing the leadership. The
reliability for leadership was 0.71.

Measurement items and data reduction
Mediator
Independent variables
To measure trust, we used two variables of trust:
trust that the crisis management actors display
toward the internal group of crisis management and
trust toward external parties other than their own.
Each variable had two measurement items: trust
exhibited in their behavior and trust exhibited in
their statements. The reliabilities for internal trust

The degree of crisis preparedness was used as a
mediator between the crisis antecedents of trust and
leadership and the crisis management outcomes of
internal coordination of crisis communications and
attribution of crisis fault to external parties. This
crisis preparedness mediator was gauged as a
composite of six measurement items: the presence
of standard operating procedures (SOPs), the use of
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Table 1. List of cases from the Transboundary Crisis Management Data Bank.

Case type

Environmental

No.

Name

Uncertainty
of crisis
definition

Medium

Long

High

Medium

28 Baia Mare disaster

Medium

Long

High

Low

21 Cryptosporidium outbreak

Medium

Short

High

Medium

9 Exxon Valdez

High

Short

Medium

Medium

31 Greece EU case

Medium

Long

Medium

Low

Low

Long

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

Long

Low

Medium

High

Medium

Low

Medium

High

Long

Medium

Medium

Medium

Long

High

Medium

High

Long

Medium

Medium

High

Medium

Low

Low

53 Estonia economic overheating 1997

Medium

Long

Medium

Medium

48 Latvia Banka Baltija

Medium

Medium

High

Medium

105 Long-term capital and the Federal Reserve

High

Long

High

Medium

107 Thailand and currency crisis of 1997

High

Long

Medium

Medium

104 The collapse of Arthur Andersen

Medium

Long

Medium

Medium

109 The collapse of WorldCom

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

10 The Enron collapse

Low

Long

High

†

5 The Hanbo scandal

High

Medium

Medium

Low

6 Y2K in Korea

High

Long

Medium

High

46 Biker wars in Scandinavia 1994–1997

Medium

Long

High

Low

54 Estonia Kostivere arms robbery 1997

Medium

Long

Medium

Medium

High

Long

Low

Low

High

Medium

Medium

Low

43 Love Canal
115 The U.S. BSE crisis
20 Yellowstone forest fire
108 1975 New York City financial crisis
7 1997 Korean financial crisis
3 Albanian pyramid scheme
15 Daewoo Group financial crisis

Legal

Level of
surprise

26 1988 epidemic among harbor seals

32 Japan and the MOX fuel falsification

Fiscal

Perceived Crisis durthreat
ation

50 Estonia refugees 1994–1995
4 Riots in Malegaon

(con'd)

Ecology and Society 13(1): 3
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss1/art3/

24 The federal raid on Ruby Ridge
Military

Medium

Long

Low

Low

High

Short

High

Medium

51 Estonia peacekeepers 1997

Medium

Short

High

Low

12 Gulf War crisis

Medium

Long

High

Low

High

Long

Low

Medium

Medium

Short

Medium

Low

14 Sino-U.S. plane crash incident

Medium

Short

High

Low

22 Somalia (Seitz)

Medium

Long

Medium

Medium

High

Short

Medium

Medium

Medium

Long

Medium

Medium

Medium

Long

Medium

Low

High

Medium

High

Low

40 Flash floods in Sirsa, India

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

34 Labor Day storm

Medium

Short

High

Low

52 Latvia spring flood 1998

Medium

Medium

Low

Medium

High

Short

High

Medium

45 Red River floods 1997

Medium

Long

Low

Medium

62 Slovenia earthquake 1998

Medium

Medium

High

Low

25 1981 air traffic controllers strike

High

Long

Low

Low

129 Armed conflict in Macedonia 2001

High

Medium

Medium

Medium

137 Assassination attempt on President Reagan

High

Short

High

Medium

114 Bay of Pigs

High

Medium

†

Low

116 Benin and the slave ship crisis

High

Long

Medium

Medium

47 Columbine school shooting (Lamaranna)

High

Long

High

Medium

30 Cuban missile crisis

High

Short

High

Low

113 D.C. anthrax situation

High

Short

High

High

112 D.C. sniper

High

Medium

High

High

High

Long

Medium

Medium

38 Election bombing in Andhra Pradesh, India

Medium

Short

High

Low

49 Estonia hijacking 1994

Medium

Medium

Medium

Low

29 Bhopal (Chaudhary)

44 NATO Kosovo crisis
111 Ranger school deaths 1995

121 The attack on Pearl Harbor
18 U.S. intervention in Somalia (Averil)
120 U.S. Navy out of Vieques
Natural disaster

37 Earthquake in Gujarat, India

58 M.S. Estonia ferry disaster

Political

8 Disaster at Waco

(con'd)
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55 Estonia referendum 1993

High

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

Long

Low

Medium

35 FAA and September 11

High

Medium

High

Medium

11 Fall of President Fujimori

High

Medium

High

Medium

19 India Pakistan Brinkmanship crisis

High

Long

High

Low

13 Iran hostage crisis and the Carter Administration

High

Long

Medium

Medium

27 Korean cargo truckers boycott

Medium

Long

Medium

Medium

56 Latvia Russian crisis 1998

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

57 Latvia Russian Securities

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

High

Medium

High

Low

Medium

Short

High

Low

Low

Medium

Medium

Low

Medium

Medium

High

High

High

Medium

Low

Medium

Medium

Medium

Low

Low

60 Slovenia independence

High

Short

Low

Medium

61 Slovenia Kosovo crisis

Medium

Medium

Low

Medium

17 Ukrainian border crisis

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

High

Short

Medium

Low

Medium

Long

Medium

Medium

1 YMCA

Low

Long

High

Medium

2 Accident at Three Mile Island (March)

High

Short

High

Medium

High

Short

Medium

High

Medium

Short

Medium

Medium

41 Hemodialysis deaths in Croatia

High

Short

High

Medium

39 Sampoong department store collapse

High

Medium

Medium

Medium

36 Ethnic violence in Assam, India

42 Lima hostage drama
110 Madrid bombing 11 March 2004
33 Nuclear waste site crisis
106 Pan Am 103 and Syracuse University
77 Pastrana’s peace process
59 President Bush’s rejection of the Kyoto Protocol

118 U.S. Military and the Mayaguez incident
117 U.S. troop deployments from Turkey

Technological

119 Apollo 13
16 Columbia Shuttle disaster

†No evaluation available.
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Table 2. Measurement items and their reliability.

Variable

Item

Alpha

Internal trust

Level of trust the actors display toward their own group through
behavior and deeds
Level of trust the actors display toward their own group through words

0.71

External trust

Level of trust the actors display toward others outside their own group
through behavior and deeds
Level of trust the actors display toward others outside their own group
through words

0.89

Leadership in dealing with a crisis

Nature of leadership effect on crisis
Degree of experience of leadership with similar crises

0.71

Crisis preparedness

Presence of standard operating procedures (SOPs)
Whether SOPs were used
Effect of SOPs on the crisis
Familiarity with similar crises
Training for crises
Available leadership

0.63

Internal coordination of crisis
communications

Level of coordination among actors or within the organization in
communicating with stakeholders and the media

Attribution of crisis fault to other
parties

Degree of crisis fault that the actors attribute to parties/groups other than
their own

Surprise to crisis management actors

Degree of unexpected occurrence of the crisis to the crisis management
actors

SOPs, the effect of SOPs during the crisis, the
familiarity with similar crises, the training for the
crisis, and the availability of command and control
systems. The reliability for this variable was 0.63.
Dependent variables
The level of internal coordination of crisis
communications was measured by this question
asked by data gathers: “What is the nature of the
coordination within the actor/organization in
communicating with stakeholders and the media?”
The attribution of crisis fault to parties other than
the management group was measured by the
following question: “To what extent are the actors
attributing fault to parties/group other than their
own?”

Control variable
The control variable, i.e., surprise to crisis
management actors, was measured by the following
question: “How unexpected was the crisis for the
decision makers?”
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations
Among the variables, crisis preparedness had the
largest standard deviation (Table 3), indicating that
there was great variability in the degree of crisis
preparedness among the 82 crisis cases. The
descriptive data indicate moderate variation in the
other variables among the 82 crisis cases (Table 3).
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Table 3. Zero-order correlations of the variables, with means and standard deviations.

Variable
Variable

Mean

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

1. Crisis
preparedness

9.57

3.52

1

2. Internal
trust

3.02

1.18

–0.083

1

3. External
trust

2.19

1.11

–0.340*

0.371*

1

4. Coordination of
crisis communication

2.98

1.46

0.197

0.345*

0.097

1

5. Leadership

3.97

1.56

0.264*

0.001

0.020

0.385**

1

6. Attribution of
crisis fault

1.51

0.88

–0.248*

0.048

–0.067

0.008

0.098

1

7. Crisis
surprise

1.21

0.72

–0.365**

0.151

0.151

–0.218

–0.256*

0.004

7

1

*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01.

In bivariate correlations, crisis preparedness was
significantly correlated with external trust,
leadership, attribution of crisis fault, and crisis
surprise. Internal trust was significantly correlated
with external trust and internal coordination of crisis
communications. Internal coordination of crisis
communications was significantly correlated with
leadership. Finally, leadership was significantly
negatively correlated with crisis surprise (Table 3).
Fit of data to proposed models
The proposed models were valid in terms of multiple
indices of model fit (Table 4). According to Byrne
(1994, 2001), Kline (1998), and Hu and Bentler
(1999), a structural equation model can be valid
when the ratio of the degrees of freedom to the chi-

square value is < 3, the comparative fit index is ≥
0.95, and the root mean square error of
approximation is < 0.08. Both models fit these
criteria (Table 4).
Effects of leadership
The effectiveness of leadership in dealing with a
crisis was associated positively with both crisis
preparedness and internal coordination of crisis
communications (Table 5). However, with crisis
surprise held constant in model B, both of the
relations became insignificant, with decreased
effect sizes. Thus, the effect of leadership in crisis
management was positive, but became moderate
when the level of surprise to the management actors
was controlled.
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Table 4. The results of model fit.

Parameter

Model A†

Model B‡

Number of crisis cases

82

82

Degrees of freedom

4

4

Chi-square

4.049

3.702

Model P

0.339

0.448

Degrees of freedom/chi-square

1.012

0.926

Comparative fit index

0.998

1.000

0.012 (0.000–0.169)

0.000 (0.000–0.162)

50.049

65.702

Root mean square error of approximation
(90% confidence interval)
Akaike information criterion§

†The baseline model.
‡The model in which crisis surprise is controlled.
§To compare models, a smaller Akaike information criterion indicates better fit.

Effects of crisis preparedness
There was a positive effect of crisis preparedness
on the internal coordination of crisis communications
(Table 5). However, with crisis surprise held
constant in model B, this relation remained positive,
but insignificant. In addition, more crisis
preparedness resulted in less attribution of crisis
fault to parties other than the crisis management
actors (Table 5). Even with crisis surprise controlled
in model B, this relation remained significant. To
summarize, the effect of crisis preparedness on
crisis communications was decreased or became
insignificant when the degree of crisis surprise was
considered. Nonetheless, more crisis preparedness
led to less attribution of crisis fault to external
parties, even when the degree of crisis surprise was
held constant in the analysis.
Effects of trust
There was a significant effect of internal trust on the
internal coordination of crisis communications
(Table 5). Even with crisis surprise controlled in

model B, the effect remained significant and
positive. In contrast, less external trust led to more
crisis preparedness (Table 5). When crisis surprise
was controlled in model B, the relation was still
significant and negative. To summarize, there were
differentiated effects of internal and external trust
on crisis management variables, even when crisis
surprise was held constant in the analysis. Internal
trust was positively associated with better internal
coordination of crisis communications, whereas
less external trust led to significantly more crisis
preparedness. Despite a positive correlation
between internal and external trust (Table 3), these
types of trust functioned differently in affecting
crisis management variables.
DISCUSSION
We think that our findings will be relevant in
planning for a wide variety of potential surprises.
The analysis of these 82 transboundary crisis cases
shows strong support for the idea that a higher level
of trust exhibited by the participants/actors leads to
better internal coordination of crisis communications
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Table 5. The results of the direct effects of leadership in crisis management: standardized path coefficients.

Model A†
Independent variable

Model B‡

Dependent variable

Beta§

SE

P

Beta§

SE

P

External trust

→

Crisis preparedness

–0.325

0.461

0.023

–0.297

0.443

0.030

Leadership in dealing
with a crisis

→

Crisis preparedness

0.277

0.246

0.011

0.206

0.244

0.056

Internal trust

→

Crisis preparedness

0.033

0.421

0.815

0.096

0.398

0.469

Surprise to crisis
management actors

→

Crisis preparedness

–0.281

0.530

0.009

Crisis preparedness

→

Attribution of crisis fault
to other parties

–0.284

0.029

0.013

Surprise to crisis
management actors

→

Attribution of crisis fault
to other parties

–0.101

0.141

0.385

Crisis preparedness

→

Internal coordination of
communications

0.332

0.034

0.022

0.240

0.035

0.104

Internal trust

→

Internal coordination of
communications

0.349

0.107

0.019

0.371

0.103

0.011

Leadership in dealing
with a crisis

→

Internal coordination of
communications

0.265

0.074

0.053

0.223

0.073

0.104

External trust

→

Internal coordination of
communications

–0.060

0.136

0.733

–0.054

0.130

0.751

Surprise to crisis
management actors

→

Internal coordination of
communications

–0.227

0.160

0.103

–0.248

0.027

0.021

†The baseline model.
‡The model in which crisis surprise is controlled.
§Standardized beta coefficient.

with the organization’s stakeholders and the media.
This finding was still relevant when we controlled
for the degree of crisis surprise to the management
actors. Trust, it seems, must be a two-way street.
The local population needs a trusted source of
information, and that source is more likely to be
trustable if they trust the people with whom they
will communicate; for example, “I will trust local
government if it trusts me enough to be prepared to
tell me the whole story.”

Our findings also indicate that more crisis
preparedness can lead to significantly less
attribution of blame to other parties. This was still
relevant, even when we controlled for crisis surprise
in the analysis. Obviously, this insight could have
direct political benefits for both elected government
officials and agency managers, who are often the
ones blamed, but it is also important for other
organizations. Reducing the “blame game” both
during and after a crisis will increase the flow of
information because people trying to respond will
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not be as worried about second-guessers, and this
will give everyone more information about what is
working, and more importantly, what is not
working. This flow of trusted information makes
the organization itself more resilient by increasing
its capacity to learn from each new crisis. Making
preparations in advance to keep information about
what is and is not working flowing to everyone can
also make these organizations a more trusted source
of information for others.

likely to do the planning necessary to achieve trusted
communication.

The data also suggest a cautionary finding. It
appears that organizations that have high levels of
trust in their own groups have reduced levels of
preparedness for a crisis. Although it is not clear
from the data what causes this, we can speculate that
it might be an unwarranted confidence (in
retrospect) in one’s own team or in the ability of the
organization to bounce back from a crisis. An
unwarranted trust in the group or its technical
capability would actually reduce its resilience and
that of the populations that it is trying to serve.

This work was funded by a grant from the National
Science Foundation.

CONCLUSION
A local population is more likely to bounce back
from a crisis such as a natural disaster or terrorist
attack if it has access to trusted information. This
means that the population trusts the sender of the
information or that it has access to alternative
sources of information that can verify a less-thantrusted source. A local population that has
immediate access to a trusted source of information
will be able to act on the information immediately
without taking time to verify it. The population will
adapt more confidently to the situation. This
confidence will enable individuals, businesses, and
communities to bounce back quickly from even a
terrible challenge to their very existence.
A community that builds trusted communications
within and among emergency responders, including
the media, will also react more quickly to the unique
situation presented by every crisis. The
organizations that must deal with a surprise will be
better-trusted sources of information, among
themselves and by the public, if they plan for the
internal and external coordination of communications
that will take place. This coordination will be more
effective if the organizations trust the people with
whom they will communicate. However, an
unwarranted belief in an organization’s own ability
to be resilient in the face of a crisis may make it less

Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss1/art3/responses/
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